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In recent years, demutualized stock exchanges have increasingly engaged in 
M&A and alliance activities. To shed light on this topic, we investigate short-run 
share price responses to the formation of 110 stock exchange M&As and alliances 
in the period 2000–2008. Our ﬁndings show that the average stock-price 
responses to a stock-exchange M&A or alliance is positive. Stock exchange 
M&As create more value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate 
more value than non-equity alliances. More value is created when the integration 
is horizontal and cross-border than when it is vertical and domestic. Evidence is 
also found for learning-by-doing effects in stock exchange integration activities. 
Finally, we find that the better the shareholder protection, accounting standards 
and degree of capital market development in the partnering exchange’s country, 
the higher the merger and alliance premium. These patterns also obtain when we 
examine long-run performance measures such as the three-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal return, change in ROA (ROE), change in liquidity, and change in 
market capitalization of IPO between years t-2 and t+2. 
 
Keywords: exchanges, mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint 
ventures  network organization 
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Kannattaako pörssien yhdistyä vai liittoutua? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 2/2010 
Iftekhar Hasan – Heiko Schmiedel – Liang Song 




Yksittäiset pörssit ovat viime vuosien aikana yhä useammin joko fuusioituneet tai 
liittoutuneet. Taustasyiden selvittämiseksi tässä tutkimuksessa estimoidaan, mil-
laisia hintareaktioita 110 pörssin yhdistyminen ja liittoutuminen ovat osake-
markkinoilla aiheuttaneet vuosina 2000–2008. 
  Tulosten mukaan osakemarkkinat reagoivat keskimäärin myönteisesti pörs-
sien yhdistymiseen tai liittoutumiseen: osakemarkkinoiden hinnat yleensä nouse-
vat, kun tieto pörssien yhdistämisestä tai pörssien muodostamasta liittoutumasta 
julkaistaan. Pörssien fuusioitumisen seurauksena osakemarkkinoiden arvostus ko-
henee tulosten mukaan enemmän kuin liittoutumisen yhteydessä. Pörssiliittoutu-
mien tapauksessa pörssien yhteishankkeet tai yhteisyritykset kasvattavat arvostuk-
sia enemmän kuin sopimussuhteisiin perustuvat liittoutumat. Arvostukset 
kohenevat lisäksi enemmän horisontaalisten ja eri maiden pörssien yhdistymisten 
tapauksessa kuin vertikaalisten ja yksittäisessä maassa toteutettujen yhdistymisten 
tapauksessa. 
  Tutkimustulokset tukevat myös käsitystä tekemiseen liittyvästä oppimisesta 
(learning by doing) pörssien yhdistymisessä. Lisäksi omistajansuoja, kirjanpito-
normit ja pörssin osakasmaan pääomamarkkinoiden kehittyneisyys kasvattavat 
näytön mukaan osakemarkkinatuottoja. Pitkän aikavälin suoriutumismittareiden 
muutosten analyysi tukee johdonmukaisesti työssä raportoituja tilastollisia sään-
nönmukaisuuksia. Työssä käytettyjä suoriutumismittareita ovat mm. kolmen vuo-
den passiivisten positioiden poikkeukselliset tuotot, oman pääoman tuottojen 
muutos, likviditeetin ja IPO:n markkina-arvon muutos. 
 
Avainsanat: pörssi, fuusiot ja yritysostot, strateginen liittoutuma, yhteisyritys, 
verkosto-organisaatio 
 
JEL-luokittelu: L22; G32; D23  
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Stock exchanges are fundamental components of the financial market by 
providing an efficient trading place for all investors and a necessary governance 
mechanism for all listed firms.
1 Recently, stock exchange mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) and alliances to expand the exchanges’ businesses globally 
have been a trend all over the world since the 1990s. This trend can be attributed 
to that the capital markets are becoming increasingly global, innovations in 
technology have removed many physical barriers to market access and more 
exchanges have demutualized to gain access to new sources of capital. The 
consolidations among stock exchanges have helped the listed firms lower their 
cost of equity financing by improving their stock liquidity, informational 
environment and governance in the secondary market.
2 Such global exchange 
activities may well promote competition, increased governance and the 
effectiveness of cross-border capital flows, and thus have the potential to benefit 
the markets and investors all over the world (US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2007). 
  A key issue that has emerged is whether certain global integration activities 
create value for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges. Because 
integration initiatives involving large, publicly traded stock exchanges were a 
relatively new phenomenon, there was little reliable information available to the 
market, or even to the merging exchanges themselves, regarding which types of 
mergers would create the most value or which exchanges would be good at 
planning and executing mergers. The growing number of demutualized stock 
exchanges has also made this question more important and interesting because 
shareholders of stock exchanges request management to maximize their share 
value.
3 
  Theoretically, it is still an open question whether stock exchange integration 
and co-operation create value for the stock exchange shareholders. On the one 
hand, consolidations of stock exchanges can create new economies of scale to 
reduce trading costs. Moreover, M&As and alliances between two exchanges 
enable them to acquire knowledge, skills and governance mechanisms from 
partner exchanges. This increases exchange revenue from increased trading 
volume and IPOs by attracting more investors and listing companies. On the other 
                                                 
1 Stock exchange disclosure (rules, monitoring, and enforcement) is an important element of 
investor protection and is positively associated with financial market development (Frost et al, 
2006). Moreover, stock exchanges often dictate corporate governance standards for listed 
companies (Mendiola and O’Hara, 2003). 
2 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Datar et al (1998) find 
that liquid stocks gain more in value than illiquid stocks. 
3 In 1998, only 38% of exchanges were for profit. In 2006, the number had increased to 75% 
(World Federation of Exchanges, 2007).  
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hand, difficult global regulatory issues that emerge in such global integration 
activities may offset the beneficial gain mentioned above. The barriers to capital 
flows such as market frictions and differences in the price of risk across markets 
will continue to delay any integration (O’Brien, 1992; Korajczyk, 1997). 
  In this paper, we try to empirically answer this question by examining 
whether and to what extent M&As and alliances create value for the shareholders 
of the partnering stock exchanges. In addition, we investigate the importance of 
differences in the characteristics of stock exchanges and integration activities in 
determining the valuation consequences across stock exchanges. Specifically, this 
paper evaluates short–run share price responses to the formation of 110 stock 
exchange M&As and strategic alliances involving 102 stock exchanges all over 
the world during the 2000–2008 period. We employ a standard event study 
methodology using a market model and extend it by adding another US market 
return term to adapt to our multi-country event testing environment. The overall 
results of this study reveal that the average stock price responses for stock 
exchange M&As and alliances are positive. Stock exchange M&As create more 
value than alliances. For alliances, joint ventures generate more value than non-
equity alliances. More value accrues when the integration is horizontal (cross-
border) than when it is vertical (domestic).
4 
  In the cross-sectional analysis, we use the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return as the dependent variable and control for deal characteristics, learning-by-
doing variables, exchange characteristics, macroeconomic variables, technological 
integration levels, difference in legal system and language as well as country and 
year fixed effects. We obtain similar results to those shown in the event study. 
Additionally, there is evidence of learning-by-doing in stock exchange integration 
activities. Finally, we find that the better the shareholder protection, accounting 
standards, and capital market development in the partnering exchange’s country, 
the higher the merger and alliance premium. These patterns are consistent when 
we examine the long-run performance measures such as the three-year buy-and-
hold abnormal return, the change in ROA (ROE), the change in liquidity and the 
change in market capitalization of IPO between the year +2 and the year -2. 
  This research contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, 
previous studies have examined the impact of M&As and strategic alliances on 
the equity values of the participating firms.
5 While the existing studies provide 
important insights into the broad use of these strategies, in each case, they do so 
by examining heterogeneous samples composed of many different industries. To 
                                                 
4 We define a deal as a horizontal integration if the stock exchange integrates with another 
exchange with the similar business model. 
5 For example, Chang (1998) finds that in M&As involving a private target firm and stock 
payment, bidders experience a positive abnormal return. For the joint ventures, McConnell and 
Nantell (1985) portray significant wealth gains from joint ventures. For the non-equity alliance, 
Chan et al (1997) reveal that the average stock price response to the formation of non-equity 
alliances is positive.  
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date, there was no evidence regarding which types of integrations would create 
the most value in the stock exchange industry or which exchanges would be good 
at planning and executing integrations. Given the importance of the stock 
exchange industry as a key component of the financial market, our study would 
help understand the wealth effect of integration activities in a highly regulated 
industry. Moreover, integration activities are mainly driven by industry shocks 
(Andrade et al, 2001). Thus, focusing on one industry may better remove the 
impact of industry heterogeneity on shareholders’ response to firms’ integration 
activities, which has not been easily controlled in previous empirical analysis.
6 
  Second, although there are many types and levels of integration, the existing 
literature mostly concentrates on only one type at a time. Although M&As, joint 
ventures and non-equity alliances vary in their dependence levels and impact on 
firms (Root, 1987; Delong, 2000), no researchers have yet included all of them in 
a single study and compared them. This leads to our second research objective: to 
investigate and compare the impact of different types of integration activities on 
value creation. This test is better done in the stock exchange industry because 
stock exchanges offer almost identical services and display less heterogeneity 
around the world compared with other industries. 
  Third, while a great deal of attention has been given to theoretical analyses, 
liquidity and the estimation of cost functions of stock exchanges, not much 
attention has been paid to the value creation for the shareholders of partnering 
stock exchanges.
7 The lack of available data on stock exchanges’ own stock prices 
is likely to be the key factor behind this. Recently, the increasing number of 
demutualized stock exchanges has made this research question more interesting 
and has also made it possible to answer this question. This paper tries to fill the 
gap in the literature with a comprehensive attempt to evaluate share price 
responses to the formation of 110 stock exchange M&As and strategic alliances 
over the 2000–2008 period. 
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the business model of 
stock exchanges and describes recent consolidation waves in this industry. Section 
3 describes the related literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
data collection procedures and the resulting sample. Empirical results are 
presented in Section 5. The final section presents our conclusions. 
                                                 
6 Business models in stock exchanges are highly homogenous because they offer almost the same 
service around the world, eg stock listing and trading. This is very useful in comparing different 
entities across counties and insulates our test from the influence of within-industry heterogeneity. 
7 Pirrong (1999) presents theory and evidence regarding the economics of exchanges themselves. 
Santos and Scheinkman (2001) construct a theoretical model and show that competition among 
exchanges leads to an efficient, but constrained outcome. Nielsson (2008) shows that Euronext 
stock exchange mergers have increased liquidity of the firms listed on them. Hasan and 
Malkamäki (2001) confirm the existence of economies of scale and scope among the stock 
exchanges.  Serifsoy (2007) reveals that diversified stock exchanges are mostly less efficient than 
exchanges that remain focused on the cash market.  
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2  Stock exchanges and the consolidation waves 
Stock exchange is a market where buyers and sellers of securities come together. 
Thus, they are primarily in the business of providing security listing, trading, 
clearing and settlement services. They also provide a necessary governance 
mechanism and a price discovery function for all listed firms. To compete with 
each other, exchanges attempt to exploit scope and scale economies in securities 
trading by listing new firms and by attracting volume in existing securities 
(Arnold et al, 1999). The deregulation and technological advancement have also 
allowed stock exchanges to integrate by M&As and alliances to enjoy the benefit 
of scope and scale economies. 
  In the history, there are mainly three integration waves in the stock exchange 
industry. The first wave of exchange consolidation started hundreds of years ago. 
In the Netherlands joint stock companies were created, which let shareholders 
invest in business ventures. In 1602, the Dutch East India Company issued the 
first shares on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. It was the first company to issue 
stocks and bonds. In 1688, the trading of stocks began on a stock exchange in 
London and other centralized exchanges in other cities followed. The invention of 
the telegraph has made it possible to create larger exchanges and contribute to 
another second wave of consolidation in the 19th century. Since the 1990s, the 
third wave of stock exchange M&As and alliances emerges all over the world. For 
example, the NYSE Group and Euronext merged their businesses under a US 
holding company, NYSE Euronext, to create the first trans-Atlantic equities 
market. In addition, Nasdaq recently announced an agreement to buy the Nordic 
stock-exchange operator, OMX. 
  In our study, we focus on the third wave of stock exchange M&As and 
alliances. This consolidation wave can be attributed to a range of significant 
changes of the industry environment. First, the earlier demutualization of 
exchanges has made this consolidation phase possible because it has allowed the 
market for corporate control to work in the exchange industry. Starting in the 
early 1990s, stock exchanges around the world have been undergoing major 
organizational and operational changes by converting from mutual, not-for-profit 
organizations to publicly-traded, for-profit firms. Following the example of the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, institutions such as the Deutsche Börse, the London, 
Tokyo, Hong Kong and Toronto Stock Exchanges, and the Sydney Futures 
Exchange have demutualized. In the United States, the two largest stock markets 
(the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ) and the three main futures 
exchanges – the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and 
the New York Mercantile Exchange – have all adopted the for-profit form. 
  Second, a major catalyst for the consolidation wave is advances in 
communication and information technology, creating new forms to conduct  
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business in this industry (Pirrong, 1999). The advent of advanced computers and 
other forms of communication has allowed markets to operate worldwide, even as 
the marketplace itself has changed. Compared with the traditional floor trading 
activity, remote membership, electronic order book trading, alternative trading 
systems, and the internalization of order flow by financial intermediaries all 
emerge in recent years. 
  Third, the investor demand has changed dramatically. Only a few decades 
ago, most stocks were held by individuals. Today, the majority of shares are 
owned by institutions such as mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds and 
insurance companies. It would increase costs and making transactions take longer 
if large institutional trades are broken into numerous smaller ones. Thus, 
institutions prefer to trade in large exchanges because they can provide vast 
liquidity. 
  Fourth, harmonization and financial integration initiatives have created a 
consolidation-friendly environment, especially in Europe. The introduction of the 
euro has added further incentives to initiate stock exchange integration activities. 
Additionally, cross-border stock exchange M&As and alliances can allow 
exchanges to come across some requirements of domestic regulations and increase 
their competitiveness globally. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement has 
made it pretty unattractive for companies who haven’t already listed here to 
choose the US because of significantly higher compliance costs. Thus, US stock 
exchanges have more incentive to acquire and alliance with foreign competitors to 
keep their market share. 
  It is still an ongoing process for this consolidation wave. There is no doubt 
that the trend of stock exchange alliances and mergers will continue, and that 
these exchange conglomerates will seek to further integrate their operations. The 
exchange initiatives such as these may very well promote competition and the 
efficiency of capital flows, and thus have the potential to benefit the markets and 




3  Related literature and hypothesis development 
3.1  Wealth effect of stock exchange M&As and alliances 
Stock exchange consolidations can create new economies of scale to reduce 
trading costs. This attracts more traders and listing companies. Additionally, 
M&As and alliances between two exchanges enable them to acquire knowledge, 
skills and governance mechanisms from partner exchanges. Krishnamurti et al 
(2003) argue that small and medium investors would be attracted to the exchange 
scoring higher on these variables: use of technology, internal control systems, 
transparency and investor protection. Thus, shareholders of stock exchanges 
would benefit from the synergy gains from improved knowledge, skills and 
governance mechanisms as well as the increased revenue from increased trading 
volume and IPOs. The existing literature has confirmed the existence of 
economies of scale and scope among the stock exchanges (Hasan and Malkamäki, 
2001). Nielsson (2008) shows that Euronext stock exchange mergers have 
increased liquidity of the firms listed on them. Arnold et al (1999) show that the 
merging of US regional stock exchanges attracted market share and led to 
narrower bid-ask spreads. 
  Despite the several sound reasons for M&As and alliances between 
exchanges, stock exchanges cannot compete as ordinary business enterprises 
because of the manner in which they are regulated and because they function as 
self-regulatory organizations. Thus, such deals have to incur some costs to 
overcome legal barriers to benefit from synergy gains. Such integrations also need 
to overcome the other barriers to capital flows, such as market frictions and 
differences of price of risk across markets (O’Brien, 1992; Korajczyk, 1997). We 
summarize the related hypotheses as follows 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The average stock price response to the announcement of a stock 
exchange M&A is positive. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The average stock price response to the announcement of a stock 
exchange joint venture is positive. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: The average stock price response to the announcement of a stock 
exchange alliance is positive. 
 
Transaction structures involving two parties can range from one-time, discrete, 
arm’s-length market transactions governed by a simple contract to complete 
integration in which the parties become one firm; joint ventures occupy an 
intermediate point (Williamson, 1979). Because drafting, organization and  
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coordination costs increase as one moves from simple contracts to full integration, 
economic efficiency implies that firms choose simple contracts over intermediate 
or integrated transaction structures. Agency theory makes the same prediction 
since alliances avoid the agency costs associated with management’s reluctance to 
release resources under their control once the need for those resources has gone 
away (Jensen, 1986a,b). 
  On the other hand, M&As might be preferred to joint ventures or alliances in 
the stock exchange industry. The reason is that new companies’ listing and 
transaction fees are the most important revenue source of stock exchanges. 
Equity-involved integrations can allow stock exchange to get materially involved 
with the new business. Based on these arguments, we provide these two 
hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 2a: More value accrues when the stock exchanges choose M&As over 
joint ventures. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: More value accrues when the stock exchanges choose joint 
ventures over non-equity alliances. 
 
 
3.2 Horizontal  and  vertical activities 
In recent years stock exchanges have been increasingly diversifying their 
operations into related business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading 
services and software sales. We define a deal as a horizontal integration if the 
stock exchange integrates with another exchange with the similar business model. 
We define a deal as a vertical integration if the stock exchange integrates with 
another exchange with the different business focus. M&As and alliances between 
two partners with the same business lines enable stock exchanges to better acquire 
knowledge, skills and governance mechanisms from partner exchanges than 
vertical deals. Moreover, they enhance the stock exchange’s market power in its 
own country or other countries. The existing literature (eg, Serifsoy, 2007) has 
shown that exchanges that diversify into related activities are mostly less efficient 
than exchanges that remain focused on the cash market. In our paper, we 
hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 3: More value accrues when the stock exchanges’ integration 




3.3  Domestic and international cooperative activities 
The demand for global exchanges has grown as more and more investors, both 
large and small, have begun to look beyond their own countries' borders for 
investment opportunities. Cross-border business opportunities are an important 
driver of stock exchange consolidation activities. Thus, cross-border integration 
activities can create more value as a result of increased oversea business 
opportunities than domestic deals. Additionally, there is a bigger difference in use 
of technology, internal control systems, transparency, and investor protection 
between the two exchanges located in different countries than those in the same 
country. Thus, the synergy gain in cross-border deals should be much larger than 
that obtained in domestic integration activities. Our hypothesis can be formalized 
as follows 
 
Hypothesis 4: More value accrues when the stock exchange’s integration 
activities are cross-border. 
 
 
3.4 Learning-by-doing  effects 
The stock exchange industry is a highly regulated industry and strict regulation 
had prevented exchanges from operating across country borders. Consolidations 
involving large, publicly traded exchanges were a relatively new phenomenon in 
the 2000s. There was little reliable information available to the market, or even to 
the exchanges themselves, about which types of mergers would create the most 
value or which exchanges would be good at planning and executing mergers. As 
more exchange consolidations occur over time, however, it is reasonable to expect 
that exchanges learn how to better plan and execute integration activities from 
their previous experience, and it is similarly reasonable to expect that investors 
learn how to better value exchange consolidation activities as they observe and 
evaluate more of them. Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 5: More value accrues when the stock exchanges have undertaken 




3.5  Difference in market development and governance 
In cross-border deals, the difference in stock market development and investor 
protection between two partners’ countries might also influence shareholder value 
creation. The more developed a stock market is, the more liquidity it can provide. 
Thus, when the partnering stock exchange locates in the country with a more 
developed stock market, there should be more synergy gain from increased 
liquidity. Similarly, the stock exchange with relatively low governance standards 
may benefit from the governance transfer effect in the process of the 
consolidation. Specifically, they learn how to govern the firms more effectively 
from partner exchanges. In the announcement of the alliance between New York 
Stock and Tokyo Stock Exchange, one potential collaboration area is regulation 
and governance (more details can be seen in Appendix 1). Frost et al (2006) argue 
that stock exchange governance mechanism is a concrete manifestation of 
country-level investor protection in the securities markets. Thus, when the 
partnering stock exchange locates in the country with higher investor protection, 
there should be more synergy gain from increased governance effects. In our 
paper, we hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 6a: The better market development in the partnering exchange’s 
country, the higher the merger and alliance premium. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: The better country-level governance in the partnering exchange’s 




4.1 Sample  description 
To pursue our research objectives, we collected data on stock exchange M&A and 
alliance announcements during the period from January 2000 to August 2008 
from a number of sources. The publicly available, monthly newsletters and press 
releases from the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE, 2000–2008) and the 
European Federation of Securities Exchanges (FESE, 2000–2008) are the most 
important data source. We also obtained some data from the internet, press 
archives and ad hoc announcements of the individual stock exchanges involved in 
the network deals. To be included in the analysis, at least one of the parent stock 
exchanges must have stock price data available for a joint venture or a non-equity 
alliance announcement. For an M&A announcement, the acquirer must have stock  
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price data available. If one stock exchange in the sample announces the purchase 
of or alliance with another stock exchange within six months of the previous 
announcement, we drop the subsequent one from the sample. We also drop 7 
uncompleted M&A deals (6 acquirers are publicly traded exchanges). 
  Our search identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances involving 
102 stock exchanges (including 14 public stock exchanges). These account from 
roughly 72% of the total number of exchanges in the world. In terms of market 
capitalization, however, the stock exchanges in the sample represent over 95% of 
the universe. In our sample, there are 30 M&A events. They are all at least 
partially stock-financed and there are no hostile deals. Although we only focus on 
acquirers’ stock response, we investigate the ownership structure of target 
exchanges. We find that only 3 target stock exchanges are publicly traded 
companies. This result suggests that only a small percentage of exchange M&As 
combined two publicly traded exchanges. Additionally, there are 16 stock 
exchange joint ventures and 64 non-equity alliances in our sample. Stock price 
data are available for two partners in 4 joint ventures and 7 non-equity alliances. 
We include each partner’s announcement as one observation in our sample. Thus, 
in total, we have 20 observations for joint ventures (8 observations from 4 joint 
ventures for which stock price data are available for two partners and 12 
observations from 12 joint ventures for which stock price data are available for 
one partner) and 71 event observations for non-equity alliances (14 observations 
from 7 non-equity alliances for which stock price data are available for two 
partners and 57 observations from 57 non-equity alliances for which stock price 
data are available for one partner). Adding 30 observations for M&As together, 
we have 121 observations in our sample. Each observation represents a single 
publicly traded exchange involving integration activities. 
  Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample events by year of announcement. 
Inspection of Table 1 shows that the number of exchange integrations is not 
evenly distributed over the 2000–2008 sample period. The largest number of 
announcements of M&A and strategic alliances in one year is 28 in 2007, 
followed by 20 in 2006. Panel B classifies the M&A and alliances. 84.55% of 
total stock exchange integration events are horizontal and 90.00% are cross-
border. These results suggest that stock exchanges prefer horizontal and cross-
border consolidations. Panel C presents the sample events by the type of 
technological integration. The results imply that one type of technological 
integration does not dominate our sample. In Addition, we provide a brief 
description of each of the types of consolidation agreements in the Appendix 1. 
  We also check whether alliances represent experimental organizational forms 
and would eventually evolve into joint ventures or mergers as proposed by Mody 
(1993). Our result does not support this assertion. Within four years following the 
formation of an alliance, only four of our sample alliances evolved into a more 
permanent form of relationship (Joint Ventures or M&As). This result is  
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4.2 Variable  definition and summary statistics 
In this subsection, we discuss the measurement of four categories of variables: 
exchange performance measures, deal-specific characteristics, exchange 
characteristics as well as country-level variables that controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions, the difference in legal system and language and the 
difference in governance and financial market development. A detailed 




4.2.1  Exchange performance measures 
Shareholder value creation, the outcome variable of interest, can be measured in 
various ways. In our paper, we use CAR[-1,1] that is the three-day announcement 
abnormal return calculated based on the extended market model. The extended 
market model parameters are estimated over the period (-150, -31).
9 The objective 
of this study is to answer whether the consolidation of stock exchanges create 
value for exchange shareholders. This is exactly what that three-day 
announcement abnormal return measures and the one those hypotheses in Section 
3 directly relate to. By examining the short-run stock price response instead of the 
long-run performance measures, we can save more observations in our sample 
when we focus on the recent stock exchange M&A and alliance activities. 
Nonetheless, to append to the overall shareholder value creation discussion, the 
three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR1, 36) is introduced in Section 5.2, 
which captures the long-term dimension of shareholder value creation. In Section 
5.3, we also introduce the variable, the difference in industry-adjusted ROE 
(ROA) between the year +2 and the year -2 to measure the change of exchange 
accounting performance. In Section 5.4, we introduce the variable, the difference 
in industry-adjusted value of share trading scaled by market capitalization of 
listed firms between the year +2 and the year -2 to measure the change of 
exchange liquidity. To measure the change of IPO volume, we introduce the 
variable, the difference in industry-adjusted market capitalization of IPO scaled 
by market capitalization of listed firms between the year +2 and the year -2. 
                                                 
8 They find that within four years of the formation of an alliance, only five of their sample 
alliances evolved into a more permanent form of relationship (joint ventures or M&As). 
9 A more detailed description of this measure can be found in section 5.1.1.  
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4.2.2 Deal  characteristics 
In our estimation, we control for several deal characteristics as follows. InterType 
is equal to 0 when the deal is an M&A, 1 when the deal is a joint venture, and 2 
when the deal is a non-equity alliance. CrossBorder is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to 1 when the deal is a cross-border transaction, and is otherwise 0. 
Horizontal is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when the deal is a horizontal 
transaction, and is otherwise 0. Public is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when 
the partner is a publicly traded exchange, and is otherwise 0. 
TechnologicalIntegration is a series of dummy variables to indicate the type of 
technological integration (outsourcing, common access, common systems, 




4.2.3 Learning-by-doing  variables 
Because one stock exchange might engage in several integration activities during 
our sample period, they can learn some lessons and draw some experience from 
them. We construct and include the variables, which measure the number of stock 
exchange own integration activities during the previous period to control for the 
potential effects of active, internal learning by doing. Specifically, NoPreMA is 
the number of previous M&A events experienced by a given exchange, NoPreJV 
is the number of previous joint venture events experienced by a given exchange, 
and NoPreAL is the number of previous non-equity alliance events experienced 
by a given exchange. 
 
 
4.2.4 Exchange  characteristics 
The exchange traits that we control for are firm size, Tobin’s q, leverage, and cash 
flow, all of which are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the integration 
announcement and come from Worldscope database. We define exchange size as 
the log transformation of total assets (Log (TotalAssets)). We define Tobin’s q as 
the ratio of market value of assets over book value of assets (Q). Leverage is 
defined as total liabilities divided by total assets (Leverage), and cash flow is 
equal to operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses minus 
income taxes minus capital expenditures, scaled by total assets (CashFlow). Stock 
returns are correlated over time. Abnormal returns of a company are driven by the 
                                                 
10 Hasan et al (2003) report increased cost and revenue efficiency of exchanges associated with 
investment in technology-related developments.  
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same firm factor. We use the variable PriceRunUp to capture this effect, which is 
the buy-and-hold abnormal return from day -150 to day -31. 
 
 
4.2.5 Country-level  variables 
We use the logarithm of GDP per capita and the logarithm of GDP growth to 
control for the countries’ macroeconomic conditions, which are from World 
Development Indicator. If two partnering stock exchanges located in the different 
countries, the difference in legal system and language might create some barrier 
for integration and reduce the synergy gain. To control for these effects, we 
construct two dummy variables: SameLanguage, which equals one when two 
partnering stock exchanges’ countries share the same language reported in atlas 
and zero otherwise and SameLegalSystem, which equals one when two partnering 
stock exchanges’ countries share the same legal origin reported in La Porta et al 
(1998) and zero otherwise. To measure the difference in stock market 
development between the partner countries, we construct the difference of three 
variables that are from World Development Indicator: market capitalization of 
listed stock scaled by GDP, stock traded turnover ratio, and total value of stock 
traded scaled by GDP (DifMarketToGDP, DifTurnover and 
DifStockTradeToGDP). We took the country-level indices on shareholder rights 
and accounting standards, and the efficiency of the legal system, from La Porta et 
al (1998) to measure the potential governance transfer effect because stock 
exchange governance mechanism can be regarded as a concrete manifestation of 
country-level investor protection in the securities markets (Frost et al, 2006). Then 
we use the product of the shareholder rights index and the efficiency of the legal 
system to construct the index of shareholder protection. The difference of the 
corresponding indices (shareholder protection index and accounting standards) 
between the two partnering stock exchanges (DifShareholderProtection and 
DifAccountingStandards) provides an indication of the difference in investor 
protection between the partnering stock exchanges’ countries.  
 
 
4.2.6 Summary  statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of our variables used in the empirical test. 
Exchange performance measures and exchange characteristics are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the effect of outliers. The summary 
statistics of these variables are consistent with what are reported in the existing 
literature. In Panel C, we observe that some exchanges experience several M&A 
and alliance events in our sample period. For example, the maximum value of the 
previous M&A (NoPreMA), joint venture (NoPreJV) and alliances (NoPreAL)  
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events are respectively 6, 3 and 11. As shown in Panels G and H, the mean values 
of the difference in capital market development and legal environment are all 
positive. These results suggest that most of the public stock exchanges are located 
in the countries with relatively more developed capital markets and legal systems. 
 
 
5  Tests and results 
5.1  Short-run stock abnormal return and the integration 
activities 
5.1.1  Event study findings 
We conduct an event study to measure the stock price response associated with 
the announcement of stock exchange M&As and alliances. Because of the multi-
country nature of our event study, we extend the market model by adding a US 
market return term to calculate abnormal return. The linear equation is specified 
as 
 
it jt t , US i , 2 jt , m i , 1 i it ] e r [ r r ε + + β + β + α =  (5.1) 
 
Where i is the exchange index, j is the country market index, t represents a one-
day period time index and ri,t represents the daily rates of return. These variables 
are calculated for all stocks in our sample using DataStream’s total return index 
(RI), which includes dividends as well as price changes. rm,jt is a domestic market 
return, and rUS,t is the US market return.
11,12 The rate of change in the exchange 
rate per US dollar is ejt. When we equation (5.1) using US data, we set β2,i to zero. 
The announcement day is day zero, the estimation period for the market model 
estimate begins on day -150 and ends on day -31. We have set the cut-off at 30 
days before the announcement date because one of the weakest points of event 
studies is information leakage, i.e.ie, some inside information is known before the 
actual event announcement. However, this might not fully solve the problem if the 
mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances had been in the making for a long 
time. Nonetheless, based on Figure 1, the cut-off at 30 days before the 
announcement date reasonably avoids the information leakage problem. The 
graphs also show that establishing strategic relationships is good news and creates 
significant value for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges. 
                                                 
11 Local market index data is the exchange stock associated market index reported in DataStream. 
12 We use the S&P 500 index to calculate US market return. When we use the Dow Jones Index to 
calculate US market return, we obtain similar results.  
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  Significance tests in our event study are based on a standardized parametric 
test statistic constructed to determine whether the mean abnormal return is 
significantly different than zero (see Mackinlay, 1997, for a detailed description 
of the test statistics and their calculation). Campbell et al (2007) find that a non-
parametric test does a better job than a parametric test in a multi-country event 
study. Thus, we also report the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
  Panel A of Table 3 shows that the three-day cumulative abnormal return is a 
statistically significant 1.4% (Z-statistic = 2.24) for stock exchange M&As, 1.1% 
(Z-statistic = 2.51) for stock exchange joint ventures and 0.95% (Z-statistic = 
2.85) for stock exchange non-equity alliances. This evidence suggests that 
establishing strategic relationships creates significant value for the shareholders of 
the partnering stock exchanges. The non-parametric tests confirm these findings. 
  Our finding that average stock price responses around the announcement of 
stock exchange M&A and alliances are all significantly positive is consistent with 
the existing literature. Chang (1998) finds that in M&A involving a private target 
firm and stock payment, bidders experience a positive abnormal return. For the 
joint ventures, McConnell and Nantell (1985) find significant wealth gains from 
joint ventures. For the non-equity alliance, Chan et al (1997) reveal that the 
average stock price response to the formation of a non-equity alliance is positive. 
  Panel B of Table 3 compares accumulative abnormal return [-1, 1] among two 
of the three groups of events: stock exchange M&As, joint ventures and non-
equity alliances. The mean value of accumulative abnormal return [-1, 1] of stock 
exchange M&As is significantly higher than that of joint ventures (T-statistic = 
4.42). Similarly, the mean value of the accumulative abnormal return [-1, 1] of 
stock exchange joint ventures is significantly higher than that of non-equity 
alliances (T-statistic = 4.28). 
  We further classify our sample into different groups to examine the patterns in 
subsamples. As shown in Panel A of Table 4, the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return is a statistically significant 2% (Z-statistic = 3.05) for cross-border stock 
exchange M&As, 1.13% (Z-statistic = 2.62) for cross-border stock exchange joint 
ventures and 1.3% (Z-statistic = 3.92) for cross-border stock exchange alliances. 
The three-day cumulative abnormal returns for cross-border integration events are 
higher and more pronounced than for other integration events. In contrast, the 
three-day cumulative abnormal return is not statistically significant and has a 
lower mean value for domestic integration events. This evidence suggests that 
more value accrues for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges where 
cross-border strategic relationships are established. The non-parametric tests (sign 
tests) confirm these findings. Panel B of Table 4 shows similar results, suggesting 
that more value accrues for the shareholders of the partnering stock exchanges 
where horizontal strategic relationships are established. 
  Six acquirers are publicly traded exchanges in seven uncompleted M&A 
deals. We examine the stock price response for there acquirer stock exchange  
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when the deal failed and show the results in Panel C of Table 4. We observe that 
the three-day cumulative abnormal return is a statistically significant -2.76% (Z-
statistic = -3.78) for acquirer stock exchanges, insignificant 0.14% (Z-statistic = 
0.03) for target stock exchanges in failed M&As. These results suggest that failed 
M&As reduce shareholder value of acquirer exchanges. 
  As indicated earlier, in our sample there are three M&As, four joint ventures 
and seven non-equity-alliances for which price data are available for two partners. 
In this sub-sample, we examine whether there are wealth transfers between the 
larger and smaller partners in the alliance. We use the market value of each firm’s 
common stock 31 trading days before the announcement of the integration to 
measure the relative size. Panel D of Table 4 compares the average cumulative 
abnormal return [-1, 1], the average market value on event day -31, and the 
change in wealth in the time interval [-1, 1] around the announcement day (market 
value on event day -31 multiplied by the average abnormal return [-1, 1]) for the 
sub-groups defined by the relative sizes of the alliance partner exchanges). 
  In three M&As deals, The average market value of the acquirers is $4,022.33 
million, which is on average more than three times that of the targets ($1,065.45 
million). Both acquirer and target exchanges experience a significant three-day 
cumulative abnormal return. These results also suggest that the target exchanges 
in the M&As receive a larger abnormal return than the acquirer exchanges. 
However, the wealth gains are almost equal. 
  In four joint ventures and seven non-equity alliances, the average market 
value of the larger partner is on average more than ten times that of the smaller 
ones. The smaller exchanges experience a significant three-day cumulative 
abnormal return. The larger exchanges experience an insignificant cumulative 
abnormal. These results suggest that smaller exchanges in the alliance receive a 
larger abnormal return than the larger exchange. However, the wealth gains are 
almost equal. We also test the potential wealth transfer between the larger and 
smaller exchange. The evidence shows that the correlation between the wealth 
increases experienced by the paired larger and smaller exchange is not significant. 
These results imply that the wealth is created by the formation of exchange joint 
venture and non-equity alliances and there is no evidence of wealth transfer 
between the partners. 
 
 
5.1.2 Cross-sectional  analysis 
In this section, we analyze the cross-sectional differences in the short-run 
abnormal returns for the M&A and alliance announcements using regression 
analysis. The model specification is as follows 
  
23 
ε + β + β +
β + β +
β + β + α = −
dLanguage DifLegalan ation icalIntegr log Techno
opment MacroDevel s aractistic ExchangeCh






where the dependent variable CAR[-1,  1] is the three-day announcement 
abnormal return. The independent variable DealCharacteristics includes InterType 
(equal to 0 when the deal is an M&A, 1 when the deal is a joint venture, and 2 
when the deal is a non-equity alliance), Crossborder (equal to 1 when the deal is a 
cross-border transaction, otherwise 0), and Horizontal (equal to 1 when the deal is 
a horizontal transaction, otherwise 0). We use the number of previous integration 
activities (NoPreMA, NoPreJV and NoPreAL) to measure learning-by-doing 
effects (LearningByDoing). The variables to control for exchange characteristics 
(ExchangeCharactistics) include exchange size (Log(TotalAssets)), Tobin’s q (Q), 
leverage (Leverage), cash flow (CashFlow) and stock price run-up (PriceRunUp). 
We use the logarithm of GDP per capita (Log(GDPPerCapital)) and the logarithm 
of GDP growth (Log(GDPGrowth)) to control for the countries’ macroeconomic 
developments (MacroDevelopment). We also control for the type of technological 
integration (TechnologicalIntegration) in the regression, whether it is mainly 
outsourcing, common access, common systems, common operations, complete 
system integration, or some other type of integration. We use the variable 
Samelanguage and SameLegalSystem to control for the difference in language 
and legal system (DifLegalandLanguage). Country and year fixed effects are also 
included in our estimation. 
  The results are shown in Table 5. We uncover three important findings. First, 
more value accrues when the deal is a stock exchange M&A compared with a 
joint venture or alliance. Second, horizontal stock exchange integration activities 
create more synergies than vertical ones. Finally, cross-border stock exchange 
integration activities create more synergies than vertical ones. These results are 
not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. On average, 
the three-day cumulative abnormal return of exchange M&As (joint ventures) is 
0.674% higher than that of exchange joint ventures (non-equity alliances). The 
three-day cumulative abnormal return of horizontal integrations is 2.819% higher 
than that of vertical integrations. Cross border consolidations generate abnormal 
returns 2.362% higher than domestic ones. 
  Our finding that horizontal stock exchange integration activities create 
synergies while vertical ones do not is similar to results in the existing literature. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Bhagat et al (1990) and Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992) show that only mergers between firms in related businesses are likely to 
generate operating synergies. Johnson and Houston (2000) reveal that only 
horizontal joint ventures create value for shareholders while vertical ones do not. 
Chan et al (1997) find that when non-equity alliances involve a transfer or pooling  
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of technology, the average stock price response is positive for horizontal alliances 
and there is no significant abnormal return for vertical ones. 
  It is worth emphasizing that the coefficients of the learning-by-doing 
variables (NoPreMA, NoPreJV and NoPreAL) are negative and statistically 
significant. If the exchange experienced one more M&A (joint venture, non-
equity alliance), the three-day cumulative abnormal return of the next integration 
activity will increase by 0.012% (0.010%, 0.014%). Thus, we find evidence to 
suggest that exchanges engaging in integration activities tend to perform better 
after they have some experience from their previous integration activities. This 
finding most likely reflects the fact that the complicated and different regulations 
in various countries encountered by stock exchanges make previous experiences 
valuable. We also find that exchange size (Log (TotalAssets)) is inversely related 
to abnormal return. Price run-up (PriceRunUp) has a negative impact of abnormal 
return. These results are consistent with the existing literature. The coefficients of 
SameLanguage and SameLegalSystem are both insignificantly positive (results 
are not reported for the brevity). 
 
 
5.1.3  The impact of the difference in market development 
In cross-border deals, the difference in stock market development between two 
partners’ countries might also influence shareholder value creation. The more 
developed a stock market is, the more liquidity it can provide. Thus, when the 
partnering stock exchange locates in the country with a more developed stock 
market, there should be more synergy gain from increased liquidity. In this sub-
section, we examine how the difference in capital market development between 
the countries of the partnering stock exchanges influences the abnormal return. 
The model specification is as follows 
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Compared with equation (5.2), we add another term (DifMarketToGDP, 
DifTurnover or DifStockTradeToGDP) to measure the difference in capital 
market development between the countries of the participating stock exchanges 
(DifMarketDevelopment).
13 As shown in Table 6, our main results do not change. 
The coefficients of the variables DifMarketToGDP, DifTurnover and 
                                                 
13 Because these three variables are correlated, we add one into the regression equation at a time.  
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DifStockTradeToGDP are significantly negative. One percentage of difference in 
the capital market development of the participating stock exchanges’ countries 
(measured by market capitalization of listed stock scaled by GDP) will lead to a 
0.168% increase of the three-day cumulative abnormal return. These results 
suggest that the better the capital market development in the partner’s country, the 
higher the merger and alliance premium. 
 
 
5.1.4  The impact of the difference in governance 
Similarly, the stock exchange with relatively low governance standards may 
benefit from the governance transfer effect in the process of the consolidation. 
Frost et al (2006) argue that stock exchange governance mechanism is a concrete 
manifestation of country-level investor protection in the securities markets. Thus, 
when the partnering stock exchange locates in the country with higher investor 
protection, there should be more synergy gain from increased governance effects. 
In this sub-section, we assemble country-level corporate governance indices and 
seek to examine how the difference in the legal environment of the countries of 
the stock exchanges influences the abnormal return. The model specification is as 
follows 
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Compared with equation (5.3), we add another term (DifShareholderProtection or 
DifAccountingStandards) to measure the difference in the legal environment 
between the countries of the stock exchanges (DifGovernance).
14 As shown in 
Table 7, our main results still hold.
15 The coefficients of the variables 
DifShareholderProtection and DifAccountingStandards are significantly negative. 
One percentage of difference in the legal environment of the countries of the stock 
exchanges (measured by the shareholder protection index) will increase the three-
day cumulative abnormal return by 0.029%. These results suggest that the better 




                                                 
14 Because these three variables are correlated, we add one into the regression equation at a time. 
15 In the reported results, we only control for DifTurnover. Our results do not change when we 
control for DifMarketToGDP or DifStockTradeToGDP.  
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5.2 Long-run  abnormal return and the integration activities 
From a stock exchange shareholder’s viewpoint, the long-run stock return after 
the integrations might be more important and valuable than the short-run stock 
return. By looking at the long-term patterns in stock returns, we are able to test 
whether the positive reaction to the exchange integration is a sign of temporary 
optimism by investors who newly gain remote access in equity trading, or whether 
the price reaction is permanent implying an increase in the shareholders’ wealth. 
To formally address this issue, first, we examine the three-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal return of the partnering exchange. The three-year period includes the 
following 36 months where months are defined as successive 21-trading-day 
periods relative to the announcement date. Thus, month 1 consists of event days 
2–22; month 2 consists of event days 23–43, etc. The three-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal return BHAR1, 36 is calculated as below 
 






t , i 36 , 1 ) R 1 ( ) R 1 ( BHAR  (5.5) 
 
where Ri,t is the monthly return and Rm,t is the benchmark return, which is the 
value-weighted exchange industry return.
16,17 
  The results show that the three-year abnormal return is significantly positive 
(T-statistic is 3.34 in T-test; Z-statistic is 3.12 in Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
18 
These results suggest that partnering exchanges outperform the value-weighted 
exchange industry return over the three-year horizon. Second, we use the three-
year buy-and-hold abnormal return BHAR1, 36 as the dependent variable and 
conduct a multivariate analysis. The model specification is as follows 
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The results are reported in Table 8 and these patterns are consistent with the 
results when we examine the short-run abnormal return. First, there is more 
improvement in long-run abnormal return when the deal is an M&A compared 
                                                 
16 Whether we use market index return or equal-weighted industry average return as the bench 
return, we draw the same conclusion. The results are not reported, but are available upon request. 
17 When we calculate the value-weighted industry return for a sample exchange, we do not include 
that sample exchange. 
18 See Barber and Lyon (1997) for more details about various measures and statistical tests used to 
detect long-run abnormal return.  
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with a joint venture or an alliance. Second, horizontal (cross-border) stock 
exchange integration activities have higher long-run abnormal return for the stock 
exchange than vertical (domestic) ones. We also find that the learning-by-doing 
effect still holds in terms of the stock exchange’s accounting ratio performance. 
Finally, the better the shareholder protection, accounting standards, and capital 
market development in the partner’s country, the higher long-run abnormal return 
for the stock exchange. 
 
 
5.3 Accounting  performance, liquidity, IPO and the 
integration activities 
In this subsection, we use accounting ratios (ROA and ROE) to measure exchange 
performance because accounting ratios capture actual financial performance over 
a period of time, while market returns are forward-looking measures of expected 
earnings. First, we calculate industry-adjusted accounting performance measures 
by subtracting asset-weighted industry performance from the levels of each of two 
performance metrics (ROA and ROE) in the years -2 and +2.
19,20 Using T tests 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, the evidence shows that industry-adjusted 
accounting performance measures are significantly positive in the years tested. 
The results suggest that exchanges entering into M&A and alliances tend to 
display superior performance relative to their industry counterparts both prior to 
and after the announcement of integration activities. We also use T tests and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to determine whether the differences in industry-
adjusted performance measures between the year -2 and the year +2 are 
statistically significant. We find evidence that performance improves significantly 
from the year -2 to the year +2.
21 Second, we conduct a multivariate analysis to 
examine which characteristics contribute to improving exchanges’ long-run 
accounting performance. The model specification is as follows 
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19 When calculating asset-weighted industry performance for a sample exchange, we do not 
include that sample exchange. 
20 When we use equal-weighted industry average accounting performance, we obtain the similar 
results. The results are not reported here, but are available upon request. 
21 A copy of the test results associated with all the performance metrics is available from the 
author upon request. See Barber and Lyon (1996) for more details of various measures of 
performance and statistical tests used to detect abnormal operating performance.  
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where the dependent variable ChangeofPerformance is the difference in industry-
adjusted ROA or ROE for integration i between the year +2 and the year -2. The 
results are reported in Table 9. First, the performance increases more when the 
deal is a stock exchange M&A compared with a joint venture or an alliance. 
Second, horizontal (cross-border) stock exchange integration activities increase 
performance more for the stock exchange than vertical (domestic) ones. Finally, 
the better the shareholder protection, accounting standards, and capital market 
development in the partner’s country, the better accounting ratio performance for 
the stock exchange. These patterns are consistent with the results when we 
investigate exchanges’ short-run and long-run abnormal return. 
  The exchange accounting performance are mainly driven by the revenue from 
trading and IPOs. Thus, we examine the pattern in liquidity and IPO after the 
announcement of integration activities. We obtain the data from the website of 
World Exchange Federation. The exchange liquidity is measured as the value of 
share trading divided by market capitalization of listed stocks. The exchange IPOs 
is measured as the market capitalization of IPOs divided by market capitalization 
of listed stocks. Similar to industry-adjusted accounting performance measures, 
we construct two variables: industry-adjusted liquidity and industry-adjusted IPOs 
and do a multivariate analysis. As shown in Table 10, we obtain similar results 
compared with those we got when we examine the accounting performance. 
 
 
5.4 Robustness  tests 
To make sure our results are not driven by a specific model, we examine another 
model based on Jin and Myers (2006) incorporating lagged market returns to 
avoid the influence of nonsynchronous trading. We use different event window, ie 
[-2,  2] and [-3,  3] to calculate abnormal return. We also calculate 
heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics by regressing CAR[-1,1] on an intercept. For 
the four joint venture announcements and the seven non-equity alliance 
announcements for which we have return data on multiple partners, we combine 
the returns of all partners in the same joint venture or non-equity alliance to form 
a value-weighted portfolio using the market values of the partner firms on event 
day -31 as weights. We then treat the portfolio as a single observation in 
conducting our event study. By combining the returns of partner firms in a given 
non-equity alliance, we avoid the problem of a lack of independence in sample 
observations because there may be a correlation in the partner firms’ returns. 




                                                 
22 The results are available upon request, although not reported.  
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6  Summary and conclusions 
We provide evidence concerning the impact of M&As and strategic alliances on 
the wealth of the partnering stock exchanges’ shareholders. We find significant 
positive wealth effects, on average, from the formation of such M&As and 
alliances. These results support the conjecture that global exchange integration 
activities may well promote the efficiency of cross-border capital flows and 
increased governance standards, and thus have the potential to benefit the markets 
and investors around the world. 
  Stock exchanges can cooperate in different ways, through for example simple 
contractual agreements, the formation of a joint venture or full integration. We 
find that stock exchange alliances lead to the creation of less value for both 
partner firms than joint ventures. Similarly, less value accrues through stock 
exchange joint ventures compared with M&As. We also provide evidence 
regarding the types of stock exchange integration activities that have the greatest 
wealth impact on the partnering firms. We find that horizontal integration 
activities tend to produce larger wealth effects than vertical ones. In addition, 
cross-border integration activities tend to produce larger wealth effects than 
domestic ones. Additionally, there is evidence of learning-by-doing in stock 
exchange integration activities. Finally, we find that the better the shareholder 
protection, accounting standards and capital market development in the partnering 
exchange’s country, the higher the merger and alliance premium. These patterns 
are consistent when we examine the long-run performance measures such as the 
three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return, the change in ROA (ROE), the change 
in liquidity and the change in market capitalization of IPO between the year +2 
and the year -2. 
  The results of this paper have significant implications for managers of stock 
exchanges. In general, the use of M&As and alliances by stock exchanges creates 
value for their shareholders. Furthermore, expanding horizontally into 
international markets provides stock exchanges with the opportunity to capitalize 
on their domestic expertise and reap handsome profits. The paper can also give 
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Figure 1.  Cumulative return around announcement of stock 
      exchange M&A, joint venture and non-equity 




















































































Table 1.   Announcements of stock exchange M&As and 
     alliances 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Year of announcement  Number of announcements  Percentage of total 
2000   5    4.55 
2001   8    7.27 
2002   8    7.27 
2003   12    10.91 
2004   13    11.82 
2005   14    12.73 
2006   20    18.18 
2007   28    25.45 
2008   2    1.82 
Total   110  100 
Panel A: Annual distribution of stock exchange integration activities 
 
 
Type of integration activities  Number of announcements  Percentage of total 
Horizontal   93    84.55 
Vertical   17    15.45 
Cross-border   99    90.00 
Domestic   11    10.00 
Panel B: Distribution of stock exchange integration activities by type 
 
 
Type of technological integration  Number of announcements  Percentage of total 
Outsourcing   17    15.45 
Common access    9    8.18 
Common systems    5    4.55 
Common operation    6    5.45 
Complete system integraton    16    14.55 
Other type of integration    55    50.00 




Table 2.   Summary statistics 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. Exchange performance measures and exchange 
characteristics are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix 2. 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
CAR[-1,1](%) 121  1.08  0.33  -5.96  6.48 
BHAR1, 36(%)  70 97.37 26.45 -66.56 212.44 
Difference in industry-adjusted ROE between the 
year +2 and the year -2 (%)  52  7.89  2.45  -4.93  16.52 
Difference in industry-adjusted ROA between the 
year +2 and the year -2 (%)  60  3.25  0.81  -2.47  8.01 
Difference in industry-adjusted exchange liquidity 
between the year +2 and the year -2 (%)  58  0.12  0.04  -0.15  0.27 
Difference in industry-adjusted exchange IPO 
between the year +2 and the year -2 (%)  58  0.11  0.03  -0.13  0.28 
Panel A: Exchange performance measures 
          
InterType 121  1.36  0.87  0.00  3.00 
Horizontal 121  0.82  0.39  0.00  1.00 
Cross Border  121  0.89  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Public 121  0.12  0.31  0.00  1.00 
Panel B: Deal characteristics 
          
NoPreMA 121  1.21  1.73  0.00  6.00 
NoPreJV 121  0.54  0.85  0.00  3.00 
NoPreAL 121  3.08  2.76  0.00  11.00 
Panel C: Learning-by-doing variables 
          
MarketValue ($ millions)  121  4,045.91 5,841.73  12.86  34,753.22
TotalAssets ($ millions)  116  7,292.16 14,817.00 30.70  60,535.95
CashFlow 116  0.11  0.10  0.01  0.41 
Leverage 112  0.59  0.17  0.39  0.79 
Q 112  2.74  2.07  1.11  8.66 
PriceRunUp (%)  121  10.00  6.00  -16.00  23.00 
Panel D: Exchange characteristics 
          
GDPPerCapita ($)  91  25,867.41 8,831.08 949.18 39,824.08
GDPGrowth (%)  91  2.99  2.41  -2.40  10.00 
Panel E: Difference in language and legal system 
          
SameLanguage 121  0.54  0.22 0.00 1.00 
SameLegalSystem 121  0.33  0.21  0.00  1.00 
Panel F: Macroeconomic development variables 
          
DifMarketToGDP (%)  91  0.18  0.77  -2.62  2.43 
DifTurnOver (%)  90  0.20  0.58  -1.54  1.59 
DifStockTradeToGDP (%)  91  0.28  0.90  -2.52  1.91 
Panel G: Difference in capital market development 
          
DifShareholderProtection 75  .79 20.68  -41.00  50.00 
DifAccountingStandards 71  4.66  13.41  -21.00  59.00 
Panel H: Difference in governance           
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Table 3.   Cumulative return [-1, 1] around announcement of 
      stock exchange M&A, joint venture and non-equity 
     alliance 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. 
 
Event type  Number of 
observations 
CAR[-1,1](%) Z-statistic  Prpportion  of 
positive value 
(sign test) 
M&A 30  1.4  2.24*  73.33%*** 
Joint venture  20  1.1  2.51*  70%* 
Non-equity alliance  71  0.95  2.85**  69.44%** 
Panel A: Announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] 
 
 




T-statistic P  value 
(Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test) 
M&A and joint venture  50  0.33  4.42***  0.01*** 
M&A and non-equity alliance 101  0.44  4.56***  0.03** 
Joint venture and non-equity alliance 91 0.11  4.28***  0.01*** 




Table 4.   Cumulative return [-1, 1] around announcement of 
      stock exchange M&A, joint venture and non-equity 
      alliance in sub-sample 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. 
 
Event type  Number of 
observations 
CAR[-1,1](%) Z-statistic Proportion  of 
positive value 
(sign test) 
Cross-border M&A  23  2.00  3.05***  78%** 
Domestic M&A  7  -0.59  -0.37  57% 
Cross-border joint venture  19  1.13  2.62***  74%* 
Domestic joint venture  1  -0.23  -0.12  0% 
Cross-border non-equity alliance  66  1.3  3.92***  71%*** 
Domestic non-equity alliance  5  -3.7  -2.21  40% 
Panel A: Comparison of announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] between cross-border and domestic 
deals 
 
Event type  Number of 
observations 
CAR[-1,1](%) Z-statistic Proportion  of 
positive value 
(sign test) 
Horizontal M&A  22  1.88  2.66***  77%** 
Vertical M&A  8  0.05  0.04  63% 
Horizontal joint venture  15  1.24  2.82***  73%* 
Vertical joint venture  5  0.51  0.5  60% 
Horizontal non-equity alliance 62  1.1  3.47***  69%*** 
Vertical non-equity alliance  9  -0.6  -0.51  66% 
Panel B: Comparison of announcement period cumulative return [-1,1] between horizontal and vertical 
deals 
 
Exchange type  Number of 
observations 
CAR[-1,1](%) Z-statistic Proportion  of 
positive value 
(sign test) 
Acquirer exchange  6  -2.76  -3.78***  0%*** 
Target exchange  5  0.14  0.03  25% 
Panel C: Analysis of failed M&A deals         
 
Exchange type  Number of 
observations
CAR[-1,1](%) Z-statistic Mean  market 
value ($m.) 
Mean change in 
wealth ($m.) 
Acquirer exchange  3  0.90  4.33***  4,022.33  36.20 
Target exchange  3  2.83  4.55***  1,065.45  30.15 
Lager joint venture partner  4  0.21  0.99  3,300.12  6.93 
Smaller joint venture partner  4  2.55  6.33***  280.54  7.15 
Larger alliance partner  7  0.18  1.05  3,046.41  5.48 
Smaller alliance partner  7 2.23  6.12***  230.82  5.15 
Panel D: Analysis of wealth effects by relative partner size 
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Table 5.   Cross-sectional analysis of CARs upon 
     announcement 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. The dependent variable is the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in percentage points. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix 2. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Dependent variable  CAR[-1,1] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal  characteristics      
InterType   -0.674*   -0.598***  -0.558***  -1.100** 
   (-1.761)   (-4.493)   (-4.352)   (-2.013) 
Horizontal   2.819**   2.800**   2.464*   3.073* 
   (2.270)   (2.227)   (1.811)   (1.933) 
CrossBorder   2.362**   2.376**   2.023***   2.143*** 
   (2.069)   (2.006)   (3.437)   (3.188) 
Public   0.002   0.006   0.003   0.003 
   (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.008) 
Learning-by-doing  variables      
NoPreMA     0.012***   0.023***   0.017*** 
     (4.684)   (3.354)   (3.250) 
NoPreJV     0.010***   0.016***   0.030*** 
     (4.019)   (4.495)   (4.707) 
NoPreAL     0.015***   0.018***   0.021*** 
     (5.563)   (4.375)   (4.626) 
Exchange  characteristics      
Log(TotalAssets)       -0.646*   -0.364*** 
       (-1.852)   (-4.650) 
Q       0.335   0.052 
       (1.315)   (0.141) 
Leverage       -3.139   -0.162 
       (-1.261)   (-0.036) 
CashFlow       0.020   0.072 
       (0.362)   (1.052) 
PriceRunUp       -0.905***  -0.901*** 
       (-4.234)   (-5.001) 
Macroeconomic  variables      
Log(GDPPerCapita)       -1.028 
       (-1.574) 
Log(GDPGrowth)       0.332 
       (0.574) 
Control  for      
Technological integration dummy 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Difference in language and legal 
environment 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.14 0.12 0.16 0.18 
No. of observations  121  121  112  83 
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Table 6.   Cross-sectional analysis of CARs upon 
      announcement controlling for the difference 
      in capital market development 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. The dependent variable is the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in percentage points. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix 2. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Dependent variable  CAR[-1,1] 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Deal characteristics       
InterType   -1.136*   -1.139**   -1.093* 
   (-1.997)   (-2.014)   (-1.978) 
Horizontal   3.125*   3.082*   3.056* 
   (1.936)  (1.890)  (1.903) 
CrossBorder   2.085***  2.120***   2.171*** 
   (4.138)  (4.148)  (4.187) 
Public   0.002  0.002  0.004 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Learning-by-doing variables       
NoPreMA   0.019***  0.011***   0.013*** 
   (4.186)  (5.207)  (4.269) 
NoPreJV   0.015***  0.018***   0.015*** 
   (4.738)  (4.736)  (4.715) 
NoPreAL   0.013***  0.020***   0.010*** 
   (4.626)  (4.605)  (3.636) 
Difference in capital market development       
DifMarketToGDP   -0.168***    
   (-4.250)     
DifTurnover     -0.168***   
     (-5.196)   
DifStockTradeToGDP       -0.076*** 
       (-4.140) 
Control for       
Exchange characteristics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.18  0.19  0.19 
No. of observations  83  81  83 
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Table 7.   Cross-sectional analysis of CARs upon 
      announcement controlling for the Difference 
     in  governance 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. The dependent variable is the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in percentage points. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix 2. In brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  CAR[-1,1] 
 (1)  (2) 
Deal characteristics     
InterType   -0.943***  -1.032*** 
   (-4.234)   (-4.454) 
Horizontal   1.913***  2.437*** 
   (5.026)  (4.459) 
CrossBorder   1.843***  2.104*** 
   (5.981)  (4.201) 
Public   0.004  0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Learning-by-doing variables     
NoPreMA   0.018***  0.011*** 
   (4.614)  (4.405) 
NoPreJV   0.016***  0.018*** 
   (4.044)  (4.056) 
NoPreAL   0.014***  0.019*** 
   (4.698)  (4.377) 
Difference in capital market development     
DifTurnover   -0.065***  -0.042*** 
   (-4.055)   (-4.382) 
Difference in governance     
DifShareholderProtection   -0.029***  
   (-3.920)   
DifAccountingStandards     -0.132*** 
     (-2.790) 
Control for     
Exchange characteristics  Yes  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  Yes  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.20  0.21 
No. of observations  54  51 
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Table 8.   Cross-sectional analysis of three-year BHARs 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. The dependent variable is the three-year buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. In 
brackets are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
country clustering. *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  BHAR(1, 36) 
 (1)  (2) 
Deal characteristics     
InterType   -3.825***  -3.315*** 
   (-4.256)   (-5.866) 
Horizontal   8.141***   16.677*** 
   (4.135)  (5.111) 
CrossBorder   3.832***  3.422*** 
   (4.344)  (4.224) 
Public   0.014  0.013 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Learning-by-doing variables     
NoPreMA   1.182***  1.422*** 
   (4.656)  (5.434) 
NoPreJV   1.101***  1.131*** 
   (4.235)  (4.345) 
NoPreAL   1.165***  1.173*** 
   (4.254)  (5.123) 
Difference in capital market development     
DifTurnover     -1.209*** 
     (-4.185) 
Difference in governance     
DifShareholderProtection     -1.134*** 
     (-4.521) 
Control for     
Exchange characteristics  No  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  No  Yes 
Technological integration dummy variables  Yes  Yes 
Difference in language and legal environment  Yes  Yes 
Country effect  Yes  Yes 
Year effect  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.18  0.41 
No. of observations  70  40 
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Table 9.   Cross-sectional analysis of exchange accounting 
     performance 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. The dependent variable is the difference in the 
industry-adjusted ROA or the industry-adjusted ROE between the year +2 and the year -
2. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. In brackets are t-statistics based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and country clustering. *, ** and *** stand 
for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Dependent variable  Difference in industry-
adjusted ROA between the 
year +2 and the year -2 
Difference in industry-
adjusted ROE between the 
year +2 and the year -2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal  characteristics      
InterType   -0.652***  -0.251***  -1.445***  -0.948*** 
   (-5.371)   (-4.688)   (-5.849)   (-5.365) 
Horizontal   1.914***   3.454***   4.951***   5.730*** 
   (5.513)   (6.202)   (5.224)   (6.316) 
CrossBorder   0.520***   0.214***   2.261***   1.862*** 
   (5.277)   (6.404)   (5.505)   (6.064) 
Public   0.006   0.008   0.012   0.013 
   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.003) 
Learning-by-doing  variables      
NoPreMA   0.062***   0.21***   0.027***   0.066*** 
   (3.342)   (4.200)   (4.296)   (5.248) 
NoPreJV   0.081***   0.010***   0.046***   0.014*** 
   (5.878)   (4.813)   (5.020)   (4.896) 
NoPreAL   0.043***   0.037***   0.013***   0.063*** 
   (5.954)   (4.580)   (6.036)   (4.248) 
Difference in capital market 
development 
    
DifTurnover     -0.088***    -0.137*** 
     (-4.185)     (-5.576) 
Difference in governance         
DifShareholderProtection     -0.027***    -0.101*** 
     (-4.521)     (-5.807) 
Control  for      
Exchange characteristics  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Technological integration dummy 
variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Difference in language and legal 
environment  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.19 0.46 0.16 0.32 
No. of observations  60  34  52  33 
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Table 10.  Cross-sectional analysis of exchange liquidity 
     and  IPO 
 
By searching public news, we identified 110 announcements of M&As and alliances. 
Specifically, there are 30 M&A events, 16 joint venture events and 64 non-equity alliance 
events in our sample of 121 observations. The dependent variable is the difference in the 
industry-adjusted exchange liquidity or the industry-adjusted exchange IPO between the 
year +2 and the year -2. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 2. In brackets are  
t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and country clustering. 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  Difference in industry-
adjusted liquidity between 
the year +2 and the year -2
Difference in industry-
adjusted exchange IPO 
between the year +2 and 
the year -2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deal  characteristics      
InterType   -0.032***  -0.023***  -0.025***  -0.020*** 
   (-4.234)   (-4.483)   (-4.367)   (-4.854) 
Horizontal   0.193***   0.321***   0.705***   0.243*** 
   (4.893)   (6.001)   (4.689)   (5.087) 
CrossBorder   0.048***   0.020***   0.039***   0.019*** 
   (4.145)   (5.234)   (4.654)   (5.112) 
Public   0.007   0.008   0.006   0.005 
   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.004)   (0.002) 
Learning-by-doing  variables      
NoPreMA   0.006***   0.020***   0.007***   0.019*** 
   (4.392)   (4.675)   (4.643)   (4.243) 
NoPreJV   0.007***   0.001***   0.008***   0.002*** 
   (5.145)   (4.235)   (5.876)   (4.123) 
NoPreAL   0.003***   0.004***   0.002***   0.003*** 
   (5.172)   (4.765)   (5.432)   (4.142) 
Difference in capital market 
development 
    
DifTurnover     -0.009***    -0.005*** 
     (-4.654)     (-4.134) 
Difference in governance         
DifShareholderProtection     -0.004***    -0.005*** 
     (-4.345)     (-4.135) 
Control  for      
Exchange characteristics  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Macroeconomic variables  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Technological integration dummy 
variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Difference in language and legal 
environment  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.24 0.40 0.17 0.33 




Sample descriptions of M&As and alliances 
The following material provides a brief sample description of each of the types of 
cooperative agreements studied. The information for each description is taken 




At the NYSE Group’s first meeting as a public company, the chief executive, 
John A. Thain, complained that the United States was losing lucrative stock 
listings to markets overseas because of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Of the largest 25 
initial public offerings last year, 23 did not list in the United States, he said. This 
year, 9 of the 10 largest offerings went elsewhere. ‘That is a very negative statistic 
for the competitive position of the United States’, Mr. Thain said. 
  After a whirlwind weekend of trans-Atlantic travel, Mr. Thain sealed a deal 
for the NYSE Group to buy Euronext, the pan-European stock and derivatives 
exchange, for $10.2 billion, forming the first trans-Atlantic marketplace. 
Euronext, which was formed from mergers of the Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels 
stock exchanges, as well as the London derivatives exchange Liffe, will become 
part of NYSE Euronext, the American holding company that will be created. 
Regulators from each country where stocks trade will continue to oversee that 
activity. (The New York Times, June 2, 2006) 
 
 
A1.2  Equity alliances (joint ventures) 
The American Stock Exchange, the global leader and pioneer in exchange-traded 
funds (ETFs) and Euronext, the first pan-European exchange, signed a 
memorandum of understanding to create a joint venture, subject to regulatory 
approval, to cross list and trade US, European and other internationally sourced 
ETFs. The joint venture will be a part of a global network of ETF marketplaces 
aiming at offering the best facilities for trading, cross listing, information 
dissemination, and marketing of the products globally. Ultimately the partners 
hope to achieve seamless 24-hour global trading of ETFs. 
  ‘Bringing Amex-listed ETFs to Europe, a critical market, is the essential next 
step in our strategy to develop a global ETF trading network’, said Salvatore F. 
Sodano, Amex chairman and chief executive officer. ‘The Amex-Euronext  
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alliance is truly revolutionary, as it aims to provide investors with the opportunity 
to trade the same class of ETF shares across time zones.’ (American Stock 
Exchange Official Website, February 7, 2001) 
 
 
A1.3 Non-equity  alliances (simple contracts) 
In a deal that allies the two biggest stock markets in the world, the NYSE Group, 
parent of the New York Stock Exchange, confirmed that it had signed a letter of 
intent to form a strategic alliance with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The alliance 
calls for cooperation on joint listings, trading technology and marketing, with the 
possibility of investing in each other in the future. The exchange’s non-exclusive 
alliance with Tokyo – loosely defined and less substantive than its merger with 
Euronext or its ownership stake in India’s national stock exchange – is an 
agreement to work together, the chief executives from the two exchanges said. 
Working groups are in place to examine possible linkages in areas like trading 
technology, cross-listings, new products including exchange-traded funds and 




Brief descriptions of all the variables and their sources 
Variables  Description  Sources 
 
Exchange performance measures 
  
CAR [-1, 1]   Three-day cumulative abnormal return (in 
percentage points) calculated using the 
extended market model. The extended market 
model parameters are estimated over the period 
(-150, -31) 
Computed  
BHAR1, 36  Three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (in 
percentage points). The benchmark is the value-
weighted exchange industry return 
Computed 
Industry-adjusted ROE  ROE minus asset-weighted industry ROE (in 
percentage points)  
Computed 
Industry-adjusted ROA  ROA minus asset-weighted industry ROA (in 
percentage points) 
Computed 
Exchange liquidity  Value of share trading divided by market 





 Exchange liquidity minus asset-weighted 
industry exchange liquidity 
Computed 
Exchange IPO   Market capitalization of IPOs divided by 
market capitalization of listed stocks 
World Exchange 
Federation 






InterType  It is equal to 0 when the deal is an M&A, 1 
when the deal is a joint venture, and 2 when the 
deal is a non-equity alliance 
Hand collected 
Horizontal  It equals 1 when the deal is a horizontal 
transaction, otherwise 0 
Hand collected 
CrossBorder  It is equal to 1 when the deal is a cross-border 
transaction, otherwise 0 
Hand collected 
TechnologicalIntegration   Dummy variables to indicate the type of 
technological integration (outsourcing, common 
access, common systems, common operations, 
complete system integration, and other type of 
integration) 
Hand collected 
Public  It is equal to 1 when the target exchange is a 
publicly traded exchange in an M&A or the 
partner is a publicly traded exchange in a joint 





NoPreMA  The number of previous M&A events 
experienced by a given exchange  
Computed 
NoPreJV  The number of previous joint venture events 
experienced by a given exchange 
Computed 
NoPreAL  The number of previous non-equity alliance 





MarketValue  Market value on the 31st trading day prior to 
announcement date 
DataStream 
TotalAssets Total  assets  Worldscope 
CashFlow  Operating income before depreciation – interest 
expenses – income taxes – capital expenditures, 
scaled by total assets 
Worldscope  
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Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
 
Worldscope 
Q  Market value of assets over book value of 
assets 
Worldscope 
PriceRunUp  Buy-and-hold abnormal return during the 






GDPPerCapita  GDP per capita   World 
Development 
Indicator 




Difference in language and legal 
environment 
  
SameLanguage,   It equals one when two partnering stock 
exchanges’ countries share the same language 
and zero otherwise 
World Atlas 
SameLegalSystem,   It equals one when two partnering stock 
exchanges’ countries share the same legal 
origin and zero otherwise 
La Porta et al 
(1998) 
 
Difference in capital market 
development 
  
DifMarketToGDP   The difference in the market capitalization of 
listed stock scaled by GDP between the two 




DifTurnover  The difference in the stock traded turnover ratio 





DifStockTradeToGDP  The difference in the total value of stock traded 
scaled by GDP between the two partnering 





Difference in governance 
  
DifShareHolderProtection  The difference in the shareholder protection 
index (the product of the shareholder rights 
index and the efficiency of the legal system) 
between the two partnering stock exchanges’ 
countries 
La Porta et al 
(1998) 
DifAccountingStandard The  difference in accounting standard index 
between the two partnering stock exchanges’ 
countries 
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